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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880257 
v. * 
RUSSELL MINER ANDERSON, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from two convictions of second degree 
murder, both first degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. S 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989). This Court has jurisdiction to 
hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is application of Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5(4)(b) 
(Supp. 1988) to guilty and mentally ill defendants violative of 
the due process clause of Utah Const, art. 1, § 7? 
2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
sentencing to the Utah State Prison defendant who was convicted 
of two homicides and failed to meet the statutory criteria which 
would have entitled him to specialized treatment and placement 
under Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5(4) (Supp. 1988)? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES AND RULES 
The applicable statutes and constitutional provisions 
for a determination of this case are; 
Utah Const, art. 1, S 7s 
No person shall be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of 
law. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-305(4) (Supp. 1989)i 
"Mental illness" means a mental disease 
or defect. A mental defect may be a 
congenital condition or one the result of 
injury or a residual effect of a physical or 
mental disease. Mental illness does not mean 
a personality or character disorder or 
abnormality manifested only by repeated 
criminal conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5 (Supp. 1988)t1 
(1) Upon a plea of guilty and mentally ill 
being tendered by a defendant to any charge, 
the court shall hold a hearing within a 
reasonable time to determine the claim of 
mental illness of the defendant. Mental 
illness, for this purpose, is determined by 
the definition stated in Subsection 76-2-
305(4). The court may order the defendant to 
be evaluated at the Utah State Hospital or 
any other suitable facility, and may receive 
the evidence of any private or public expert 
witness whose evidence is offered by the 
defendant or the prosecutor. A defendant who 
tenders a plea of "guilty and mentally ill" 
shall be examined first by the trial judge in 
compliance with the standards for taking 
pleas of guilty. The defendant shall be 
advised that a plea of guilty and mentally 
ill is a plea of guilty and not a contingent 
plea. If the defendant is later found not to 
be mentally ill, a guilty plea otherwise 
lawfully made remains a valid plea of guilty 
and the defendant shall be sentenced as any 
other offender. If the court concludes that 
the defendant is currently mentally ill, 
applying the standards set forth in this 
section, the defendant's plea shall be 
accepted and he shall be sentenced as a 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5 was amended in 1989 to delete any 
reference to "other suitable facility." Other numerical changes 
were made. Reference herein will be to the 1988 version in 
effect at the time of defendant's plea. 
mentally ill offender. Expenses of 
examination, observation, or treatment, 
excluding travel to and from any mental 
health facility, shall be charged to the 
county, except when the offense is a state 
offense, the state shall pay part of all of 
the expense where the Legislature has 
expressly appropriated money for this 
purpose. Travel expenses shall be charged to 
the county in which the prosecution is 
commenced. Examination of defendants charged 
with municipal or county ordinance violations 
shall be charged to the municipality or 
county commencing the prosecution. 
(3) If the defendant is found guilty and 
mentally ill, the court shall impose any 
sentence which could be imposed under law 
upon a defendant who is convicted of the same 
offense. Before sentencing, the court shall 
conduct a hearing to determine the 
defendant's present mental status. 
(4) The court shall in its sentence order 
hospitalization at the Utah State Hospital or 
other suitable facility if, upon completion 
of the hearing and consideration of the 
record, the court finds by clear and 
convincing evidence that: 
(a) the defendant has a mental illness 
as defined by Subsection 76-2-305(4); 
(b) because of his mental illness the 
defendant poses an immediate physical 
danger to others or self, which may 
include jeopardizing his own or others' 
safety, health, or welfare if placed in a 
correctional or probation setting, or 
lacks the ability to provide the basic 
necessities of life, such as food, 
clothing, and shelter, if placed on 
probation; 
(c) the defendant lacks the ability to 
engage in a rational decision-making 
process regarding the acceptance of mental 
treatment as demonstrated by evidence of 
inability to weigh the possible costs and 
2 benefits of treatment; 
(d) there is no appropriate treatment 
alternative to a court order of 
hospitalization; and 
(e) the Utah State Hospital or other 
suitable facility can provide the 
defendant with treatment, care, and 
custody that is adequate and appropriate 
to the defendant's conditions and needs. 
(7) The period of confinement to the Utah 
State Hospital or other suitable facility, 
as provided for in this section, may in no 
circumstance be longer than the maximum 
sentence imposed by the court. 
(8) When the Utah State Hospital or other 
suitable facility proposes to discharge a 
defendant prior to the expiration of 
sentence, the institution shall transmit 
to the Board of Pardons a report on the 
condition of the defendant, including the 
clinical facts, the diagnosis, the course 
of treatment, the prognosis for the 
remission of symptoms, the potential for 
recidivism and for the danger to himself 
and the public, and the recommendations 
for future treatment. The Board of 
Pardons shall direct that the defendant 
serve any or all of the unexpired term of 
the sentence at the Utah State Prison, or 
place the defendant on parole. If the 
Board of Pardons, pursuant to law or 
administrative rules, considers for parole 
any defendant who has been adjudged guilty 
and mentally ill, the board shall consult 
with the treating facility or agency and 
an additional report on the condition of 
the defendant may be filed with the board. 
Pending action of the board, the defendant 
shall remain at the institution at which 
he is hospitalized. If the defendant is 
placed on parole, treatment shall, upon 
the recommendation of the hospital 
2 
Subsections (c) and (d) were found unconstitutional as applied 
to criminal defendants and should be disregarded for purposes of 
this appeal. State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271-72 (Utah 
1988). 
facility, be made a condition of parole, 
and failure to continue treatment or other 
condition of parole except by agreement 
with the designated facility and the Board 
of Pardons is a basis for initiating 
parole violation hearings. The period of 
parole may not be for fewer than five 
years or until the expiration of the 
defendant's sentence, whichever comes 
first, and may not be reduced without 
consideration by the Board of Pardons of a 
current report on the mental health status 
of the offender. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Russell Miner Anderson, was charged by 
information with two counts of criminal homicide, murder in the 
first degree, each a capital offense (R. 23-24). Under a plea 
agreement, the charges were reduced to two counts of murder in 
the second degree, first degree felonies, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1989), to which defendant entered 
pleas of guilty and mentally ill (R. 23, 25, 28-35). 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5 (Supp. 1988), 
an evidentiary hearing was held prior to sentencing before the 
Honorable Leonard H. Russon, Judge, Third Judicial District, 
State of Utah. On June 15, 1988, the trial court found defendant 
mentally ill but not otherwise meeting the criteria of § 77-35-
21.5, and sentenced defendant to the Utah State Prison for two 
consecutive terms of five years to life (R. 59-61). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On July 22, 1987, the bodies of Norman and Janet 
Armstrong, a mentally defective couple, were found below 
Interstate 80 at approximately 6000 West North Temple, Salt Lake 
County, Utah (R. 24; R. 90 at 21). Each had died from multiple 
gunshot wounds (R. 24). Three days later, defendant was arrested 
and charged with the murders as capital offenses (R. 3, 23-25)• 
On March 16, 1988, having considered all relevant 
pretrial evaluations, the Honorable James S. Sawaya, Judge, Third 
Judicial District, found defendant competent to stand trial (R. 
5, 92). Defendant does not contest the competency finding. 
Shortly thereafter on April 4, 1988, as a result of 
plea bargaining, the charges were reduced to two counts of murder 
in the second degree, first degree felonies, to which defendant 
entered pleas of guilty and mentally ill (R. 23, 25, 28-35). 
Defendant was advised, at the time of the plea, by the Honorable 
Leonard Russon, Judge, Third Judicial District, consistent with 
the requirements of Utah R. Crim. P. 11(5). Further, defendant 
was advised that his plea was not a contingent plea. The 
determination of whether defendant was mentally ill would dictate 
placement for purposes of sentencing but not otherwise affect the 
validity of the guilty plea (R. 92; R. 89 at 3-4). Defendant 
does not challenge the entry of his plea. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5(1) (Supp. 
1988), an evaluation of defendant was ordered prior to sentencing 
to determine if defendant fit within the statutory definition of 
guilty and mentally ill and should, therefore, be placed at a 
facility other than the prison for treatment (R. 36, 38-39). An 
evidentiary hearing was held before Judge Leonard Russon on June 
14 and 15, 1988 (R. 58-59). Having considered the testimony of 
five psychologists and two lay witnesses, the trial court found 
defendant to be mentally ill as defined in Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-
305(4) (Supp. 1989) but not otherwise meeting the criteria of 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5(4), such that specialized placement 
would be appropriate (R. 59-61). Judge Russon then sentenced 
defendant to the statutory term of five years to life on each 
count, to run consecutively (R. 60-61). Written -Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law" were entered on June 26, 1988 (R. 
71-75). (See Appendix attached for complete Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law). 
The testimony presented at the evidentiary hearing 
consisted of that of Doctors Stephen Golding and Oren H. Ogilvie 
for the defense; and, Doctors Van 0. Austin, Robert J. Howell and 
Robert Heinbecker as well as two jail guards for the State (R. 
89). 
Dr. Oren H. Ogilvie, as the clinical director for the 
Davis County Mental Health Center, had evaluated defendant in 
1987 in connection with a third and separate homicide charge in 
Davis County (R. 89 at 8). The purpose of the 1987 evaluation 
was only to determine defendant's competency to stand trial and 
whether he had diminished mental capacity at the time of the 
Davis County homicide (R. 89 at 10; Exhibit 1-D). Dr. Ogilvie 
never specifically evaluated defendant for purposes of sentencing 
placement but based his present conclusions on the prior 
evaluation. Dr. Ogilvie testified that defendant had "mild to 
moderate retardation" with defendant's I.Q. score being 
3 
consistently in the high 60's range since 1964 (R. 89 at 10). 
3 
The average I.Q. is considered to be between 90 and 100; "sub-
average intellectual functioning" is defined as an I.Q. 70 or 
below (R. 89 at 22). 
Based on this, Dr. Ogilvie concluded defendant to be mentally ill 
as statutorily defined in Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-305(4) (R. 89 at 
11-12). Further, he believed that without "very significant 
structural limitations placed on [defendant's] activities and 
behavior", defendant would represent a serious danger to others 
if ever released from custody (R. 89 at 13). Dr. Ogilvie had 
some concerns of defendant being led by others if incarcerated at 
the prison based on a report of Dr. Judith Sheperd done in 1973 
as part of a 90-day presentence evaluation (R. 89 at 13-14; 
Exhibit 2-D). However, Dr. Ogilvie did not have nor consider the 
reports of defendant's long term incarceration at the Utah State 
Prison in 1981-82 nor at Bonneville Community Correction Center 
in 1982 (R. 89 at 20). Dr. Ogilvie did not express an opinion as 
to the appropriateness of placing defendant at the state mental 
hospital nor as to any need for treatment. 
The defense next called Dr. Stephen Golding, professor 
of psychology and director of clinical training at the University 
of Utah (R. 89 at 24-25). Dr. Golding had evaluated defendant in 
May of 1988 for purposes of this case to determine appropriate 
placement of defendant under the criteria of Utah Code Ann. § 77-
35-21.5(4) (R. 89 at 25). Dr. Golding agreed that defendant was 
mildly to moderately retarded. He classified such mental 
retardation as mental illness as statutorily defined (R. 89 at 
28-29). Dr. Golding testified that in his opinion defendant also 
suffered from several personality disorders, specifically 
••dependent personality disorder, schizoid personality and 
antisocial personality disorder" (R. 89 at 33). Dr. Golding 
agreed with Dr. Ogilvie that in a probationary or unstructured 
setting, defendant posed a serious danger to others. The doctor 
believed that if defendant had access to drugs, he could commit 
another homicide (R. 89 at 36). Dr. Golding had never observed 
defendant in a custodial setting and was not specifically 
familiar with the structure of the Utah State Prison (R. 89 at 
60, 65). Despite this, Dr. Golding testified that in a 
correctional setting such as the Utah State Prison, defendant 
might be "chosen as a victim" and was very likely to come to the 
attention of prison authorities through attempts to obtain 
illegal drugs or by acting out (R. 89 at 41-42). For this 
reason, Dr. Golding testified defendant should be placed at the 
state hospital because it offered a "consistent and secure" 
environment whereas in his opinion defendant could more easily 
secure drugs at the prison (R. 89 at 51-53). Contrary to all the 
other experts, Dr. Golding testified that defendant could improve 
through treatment even though the "fundamental retardation will 
not get better" (R. 89 at 55). In this regard, Dr. Golding 
conceded that while he preferred the state hospital, defendant 
could be adequately treated for all his mental illnesses at the 
state prison (R. 89 at 80). Dr. Golding could not predict if 
defendant, even with treatment, would ever be able to function on 
his own in society because of his dangerousness (R. 89 at 55). 
On the basis of the above testimony, the defense rested 
(R. 89 at 81). 
The State called Drs. Austin and Heinbecker, forensic 
psychiatrists at the Utah State Hospital, and Dr. Howell, a 
consulting psychologist at the hospital. Dr. Austin had 
evaluated defendant in 1973, and twice in 1988 (R. 89 at 82). In 
all three evaluations, Dr. Austin had concluded that defendant 
was not clinically mentally ill (R. 89 at 83). However, he 
recognized that under the Utah statutory definition of mental 
illness as a mental defect, defendant's mental retardation would 
be classified as mental illness (R. 89 at 84). In his opinion, 
the only treatment needs of defendant were general counseling for 
drug abuse and vocational training. Both of these could be met 
at the state prison (R. 89 at 93). Dr. Howell agreed with Dr. 
Austin but viewed defendant as having a personality disorder in 
that he abused alcohol and drugs (R. 89 at 98). Having reviewed 
the records of defendant's prior incarceration in prison, Dr. 
Howell saw no problem with defendant being placed in the prison 
and did not view the state hospital as suitable (R. 89 at 100). 
Based on defendant's history of aggressive acts to others, Dr. 
Howell believed defendant posed a danger to other persons unless 
in a structured environment (R. 89 at 99-100). Dr. Heinbecker 
testified similarly, concluding that defendant did not have any 
mental diseases or defects which the hospital could treat 
effectively (R. 89 at 129, 132, 132-134). The doctors agreed 
with the other experts that based on the statutory definition of 
mental illness under S 76-2-305(4), defendant qualified as 
mentally ill but that his only "mental illness" was mental 
retardation (R. 89 at 84, 102, 128). All three doctors from the 
Utah State Hospital agreed that their institution could not 
properly treat defendant's mental retardation (T. 83, 104, 128). 
Based on their observations of defendant while 
incarcerated at the Salt Lake County Jail, Corporal Kelly Roberts 
and Officer Edward Culbert of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Office testified that defendant posed no danger to himself or 
others while jailed. In their opinion, defendant was a model 
prisoner while incarcerated (T. 120-21, 124-25). 
Based on all the testimony, Judge Russon ruled 
defendant had failed to met his burden of establishing by clear 
and convincing evidence that appropriate placement of defendant 
would be in a facility other than the state prison (R. 74, 
Findings, 11 9). (See Appendix attached for Complete Findings of 
Fact). The trial court found defendant mentally ill under § 76-
2-305(4) based on defendant's mild to moderate mental retardation 
(R. 72, Findings, 11 2). The court found that defendant "has 
several personality disorders and tends to abuse drugs and 
alcohol, conditions which do not constitute mental illness as set 
by § 76-2-305(4)" (R. 73, Findings, % 3). 
With regard to S 77-35-21.5(4)(b), the trial court 
concluded that based on defendant's previous incarcerations, he 
would not be an immediate physical danger to others or self in a 
correctional institution, "where he would not have access to 
drugs or alcohol" (R. 72, Findings, 11 5). The court specifically 
found that defendant would be able to function at the state 
prison based on the evidence of defendant's prior long term 
incarcerations (R. 72, Findings, 11 5). 
In determining that the prison was a suitable facility 
for defendant and could provide all necessary treatment and 
vocational needs, the trial court also considered the testimony 
of all the experts that defendant presented a danger to society 
and concluded in reference to S 77-35-21.5(4)(e) that: 
[T]he Utah State Hospital is not a suitable 
facility for providing the defendant with the 
treatment, care and custody that is 
appropriate to the defendant's conditions and 
needs, because no therapies are available to 
treat defendant's problem of retardation 
which is permanent. Further, that the Utah 
State Hospital cannot provide the secure 
custody necessary for defendant who stands 
convicted of two homicides in Salt Lake 
County, is awaiting sentencing in Davis 
County on a subsequent second degree 
homicide, and who tends to abuse drugs and/or 
alcohol. 
(R. 73-74, Findings, II 8). The court, therefore, sentenced 
defendant on each count to the statutory indeterminate term of 
five years to life, to run consecutively, and to be served at the 
Utah State Prison (R. 60-61). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant raises for the first time on appeal the issue 
of whether the application of Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5(4)(b) 
(Supp. 1988) to guilty and mentally ill defendants violates due 
process of law. Having failed to properly raise the issue below, 
this Court should preclude defendant from attacking the 
constitutionality of S 77-35-21.5(4)(b) on appeal. 
Should this Court consider defendant's constitutional 
claim on the merits, Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5(4)(b) must be 
viewed as a constitutional legislative enactment in that the 
statute rationally effectuates a legitimate governmental 
objective and is fair in its application to all guilty and 
mentally ill offenders. 
Even assuming arguendo, the trial court erred in 
interpreting Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-305(4) (Supp. 1989) as 
excluding all personality disorders from its definition of mental 
illness, the court cured any error by affording defendant the 
opportunity to demonstrate that his personality disorders were 
within the correct statutory definition. Further, the trial 
court factually found defendant mentally ill for sentencing 
purposes. 
Since there is ample evidence to support its findings 
and conclusions, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
determining that the Utah State Prison was the optimal facility 
to treat and care for defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. S 77-35-
21.5(4)(b) (SUPP. 1988) TO GUILTY AND 
MENTALLY ILL DEFENDANTS DOES NOT VIOLATE 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
A. Defendant is Precluded from Raising the 
Constitutionality of Utah Code Ann. § 77-
35-21.5(4)(b) for the First Time on 
Appeal. 
Defendant raises for the first time on appeal the 
question of whether the application of Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-
21.5(4)(b) (Supp. 1988) to guilty and mentally ill defendants 
violates Utah'8 due process clause. Absent exceptional 
circumstances, an appellate court should not consider issues 
raised for the first time on appeal. State v. Steggell, 660 P.2d 
252, 254 (Utah 1983); State v. Van Matre# 777 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah 
1989). This rule applies as well to constitutional issues. 
*-* *•»* *•»•» /ni-Ah 1 9 8 2 1 . 
Here, defendant has been found guilty of two homicides 
and does not contest that finding. His complaint is with the 
court's determination of placement for purposes of sentencing and 
treatment. As such, M[t]he defendant's right to liberty is not 
in issue because he will be confined, either in the hospital or 
in prison," State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271 (Utah 1988). 
Accord, Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 815-17 (1st Cir. 1988). 
This Court should therefore preclude defendant from raising a 
constitutional attack against § 77-35-21.5(4)(b) for the first 
time on appeal. 
B. Utah Code Ann. Section 77-35-21.5(4)(b) 
Rationally Effectuates a Legitimate 
Governmental Objective and is Thus Not 
Violative of the Due Process Clause. 
In the event this Court addresses defendant's due 
process claim, the challenged statute must be reviewed for 
constitutional deficiency on its face and as applied. Wells v. 
Children's Aid Society of Utah, 681 P.2d 199, 204 (Utah 1984). 
However, statutes must be construed to avoid constitutional 
infirmities whenever possible. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 
1314, 1317 (Utah 1983); In re Boyer, 636 P.2d 1085, 1088 (Utah 
1981). Legislative enactments are entitled to a presumption of 
constitutionality. State v. Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 
1987). Accord, In Re N.H.B., 112 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah App. 
1989). Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5 (Supp. 1988) which governs 
the sentencing hearing for guilty and mentally ill defendants is 
a procedural rule by which a trial court ascertains whether the 
prison or another facility would be suitable for a convicted 
felon. As such, the general test of MfairnessH applies. Wells 
v. Children's Aid Society, 681 P.2d at 204. 
Applying the above, defendant fails to show that the 
sentencing statute is unfair as applied to him or other guilty 
and mentally ill defendants. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5(4) enumerates certain 
criteria which a guilty and mentally ill defendant must satisfy 
by clear and convincing evidence to qualify for sentencing to the 
state mental hospital or other suitable facility, rather than the 
state prison. One of those criteria, subsection (b), obligates 
the sentencing court to consider whether as a result of his 
mental illness, a guilty and mentally ill defendant poses a 
danger to others or himself if placed in a correctional facility 
or probationary setting. If the defendant is found to be of 
immediate physical danger to others or himself in a correctional 
setting, the trial court should consider other suitable 
facilities. If, however, the defendant would be of no danger to 
himself or others in a correctional facility, the defendant may 
be sentenced to prison. Thus, subsection (b) results in an 
additional procedural safeguard to a convicted felon, who would 
otherwise be subject to confinement in prison, by requiring the 
trial court to specifically consider the suitability of other 
placement if the defendant establishes that as a result of his 
mental illness he would present a danger to himself or others if 
imprisoned. 
Defendant seems to argue that because this Court in 
State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), found 
unconstitutional the application of subsections (c) and (d) of S 
77-35-21.5(4) to guilty and mentally ill defendants, subsection 
(b) must necessarily also be found to have "no relevance in the 
context of criminal sentencing" and hence violative of Utah's due 
process provision. (Br. of App. at 9-11). However, defendant 
fails to recognize that subsections (c) and (d) were solely 
limited to confinement issues which this Court determined had 
relevance to an involuntary civil commitment but were 
inappropriate to a criminal defendant. Ici. at 1271-72. 
Subsection (b), on the other hand, deals directly with the issue 
of placing a convicted and mentally ill defendant into the 
correct facility for purposes of his own security as well as 
society's. As such, it rationally relates to the legislative 
objective behind § 77-35-21.5(4), that is the balancing of 
defendant's treatment rights against society's obligation to 
protect its citizens from potentially dangerous individuals. Id. 
at 1271. Defendant's due process argument for invalidating 
subsection (b) ignores the legislative prerogative of balancing 
these two conflicting interests. 
Subsection (b) inquires whether a mentally ill 
defendant, as a result of his mental illness, poses a danger to 
others or himself in a correctional setting. If a convicted 
defendant poses no physical danger because of his mental illness 
in a correctional facility, defendant may, as any convicted 
felon, be sentenced to prison. If, on the other hand, because of 
his mental illness, defendant would be a danger to others or 
himself if incarcerated, correctional disposition would be 
improper and defendant should be considered for specialized 
treatment. State v. Deplonty, 749 P.2d 621, 626 (Utah 1987). 
Subsection (b) rationally effectuates the legitimate 
governmental objective of balancing a defendant's treatment needs 
against society's security interests. State v. Copeland, 765 
P. 2d 1266, 1271. It requires the sentencing court to consider 
whether a guilty, potentially dangerous criminal who is also 
mentally ill can be treated for his mental illness and still be 
secured away from society. This balancing is coupled with a 
subjective evaluation of defendant and any symptomatic 
dangerousness to himself and others. The subjectiveness of 
subsection (b) provides an additional safeguard for a mentally 
ill criminal defendant. Rather than generalizing as to 
suitability of the state hospital, prison or probation for all 
mentally ill defendants, the statute requires the trial court to 
specifically consider the appropriateness of the individual 
defendant in probationary and correctional settings. 
Subsection (b) is fair in its application and 
rationally related to a legitimate legislative purpose. 
Therefore, this Court should reject defendant's due process 
argument and find subsection (b) constitutionally valid as 
applied to guilty and mentally ill defendants. In re Boyer, 636 
P.2d 1085, 1088; Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY SENTENCED TO PRISON 
DEFENDANT WHO WAS CONVICTED OF MULTIPLE 
HOMICIDES AND FAILED TO MEET STATUTORY 
CRITERIA WHICH WOULD HAVE ENTITLED HIM TO 
SPECIALIZED TREATMENT. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5 (Supp. 1988), 
the trial court conducted an extensive evidentiary hearing to 
determine if defendant, who had entered guilty and mentally ill 
pleas to two homicides, satisfied the statutory criteria for 
specialized placement (R. 89, 90). Based on the expert 
testimony, the trial court concluded that defendant had failed to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence the appropriateness or 
necessity of his placement at the state hospital or another 
facility (R. 71-75). This Court will only disturb a trial 
court's factual findings when clearly erroneous, State v. 
DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 627 (Utah 1987), and reviews a trial 
court's sentencing decision only for abuse of discretion. State 
v. Gibbons, No. 860405, slip op. at 2 (Utah, Sept. 13, 1989); 
State v. Holland, 111 Utah Adv. Rep. 8, 12-14 (1989); State v. 
Shelby, 728 P.2d 987, 988 (Utah 1986). Contrary to defendant's 
argument, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
imposing a sentence which "could be imposed under the law upon a 
defendant who is convicted of the same offense", Utah Code Ann. § 
77-35-21.5(3). 
A. Mental Retardation Statutorily Constitutes 
Mental Illness. 
The State is aware that this Court has recognized a 
distinction between mental retardation and mental illness: 
there are significant differences between 
mental retardation and mental illness and ... 
those differences may not be ignored. . . . 
State v. Murphy, 760 P.2d 280, 284 (Utah 1988). Mental 
retardation is an impairment in learning capacity and thus may be 
ameliorated with proper education and training. Mental illness, 
on the other hand, is a psychotic disorder which notably impairs 
mental functioning. It is treatable with psychiatric and drug 
therapy, and proper counseling. Id. at 15/ relying on McClure v. 
State, 737 P.2d 1001 (Utah 1987). The civil statutes have 
recognized these distinctions. See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-12-
202(8) (Interim Supp. 1989) defining mental illness as: 
a psychiatric disorder as defined by the 
current Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders which substantially impairs 
a person's mental, emotional, behavioral, or 
related functioning; 
and, Utah Code Ann. S 62A-5-301(3) (Cumm. Supp. 1988) defining 
mental retardation as: 
a significant, subaverage general 
intellectual functioning, existing 
concurrently with deficits in adaptive 
behavior and manifested during the 
developmental period as defined in the 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Method 
Disorders published by the American 
Psychiatric Association. 
However, for purposes of the criminal statutes, the 
distinction does not exist. Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-305(4) 
includes mental retardation in its definition of mental illness: 
"Mental illness" means a mental disease or 
defect. A mental defect may be a congenital 
condition or one the result of injury or a 
residual effect of a physical or mental 
disease. . . . 
Mental defect is considered synonymous with mental retardation. 
Matter of McDuel, 369 N.W.2d 912 (Mich. App. 1985). 
The statutory definition presents some problems to 
psychiatrists who do not clinically classify mental retardation 
as mental illness. Some psychiatrists, like Dr. Van Austin of 
the state hospital, even find it clinically offensive that mental 
retardation is classified as mental illness (R. 89 at 84). See 
also Kindred, Cohen and Penrod, The Mentally Retarded Citizen and 
the Law (T. Shaffer eds. 1976), cited in State v. Murphy, 760 
P.2d at 285. 
However, as this Court has noted, "legislative 
enactments are accorded a presumption of validity," State v. 
Hoffman, 733 P.2d 502, 505 (Utah 1987). Statutes are not to be 
declared unconstitutional if there is any reasonable basis to 
sustain them. Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314, 1317 (Utah 
1983). 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-305(4) is patterned on a Model 
Penal Code provision which was deliberately designed to broadly 
encompass changes in clinical findings of mental disease. The 
Model Code commentators found that a determination of what 
constitutes mental disease or defect for purposes of criminology 
could not be resolved as a question of medical terminology, and 
thus, concluded the only feasible course was to treat: 
the question of disease as one of fact, to be 
determined by the court or jury on evidence 
presented in the cases that arise. 
Explanatory Note, Model Penal Code S 4.01, Mental Disease or 
4 
Defect Excluding Responsibility, (1985) at 174. 
While the Utah legislative history does not shed light 
on the reasoning behind the adoption of the language of § 76-2-
305(4), other than it was the model penal code version, it can 
reasonably be concluded that the legislature wanted to confer the 
benefit of additional sentencing procedural safeguards on the 
4 
The Model Penal Code provision and Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-305(4) 
primary purpose is to define mental illness for purposes of 
criminal responsibility. Section 76-2-305(4) is the only 
definition utilized for criminal determination of mental illness 
under Utah law. 
mentally defective offender as broadly as the traditional 
mentally ill offender. The legislative purpose of balancing the 
placement needs of a mentally or emotionally impaired defendant 
with society's need for protection and punishment remain the same 
whatever the source of defendant's impairment. It is the actual 
placement decision based on defendant's need for treatment and 
dangerousness to self or others which may vary. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-21.5(4) provides an additional 
level of procedural due process for a defendant. It can only be 
invoked where the defendant has raised the issue of his mental 
status. Once raised, the lower court is mandated to comply with 
the evaluation and hearing requirements of the rule. State v. 
DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 627 (Utah 1988). The protection of the 
statute can easily be seen from the posture of defendant in this 
case. Defendant does not argue that the statutory definition is 
overly broad because he desires mental retardation in and of 
itself to be the basis of specialized treatment. Defendant does 
not argue for the more clinically accurate distinctions of State 
v. Murphy to apply because defendant wishes this Court to be 
obligated, as was the trial court, to consider defendant mentally 
ill. 
Thus, while the statutory definition of mental illness 
in criminal proceedings is inconsistent with common clinical 
definitions of mental illness and ignores the differentials of 
mental retardation, its very breadth inures to the benefit of 
convicted defendants in providing an additional sentencing 
alternative. 
B. Any Error in Interpreting Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-
305(4) as Excluding all Personality Disorders is 
Harmless. 
Defendant argues that the trial court erroneously 
interpreted Utah Code Ann. S 76-2-305(4) as excluding all 
personality disorders from the statute's definition of mental 
illness. (Br. of App. at 13). The phrase in question reads: 
Mental illness does not mean a personality 
or character disorder or abnormality 
manifested only by repeated criminal conduct. 
S 76-2-305(4). Defendant contends that the trial court 
erroneously assumed the phrase "manifested only by repeated 
criminal conduct" modified only the last antecedent, 
"abnormalities". Under such an interpretation, S 76-2-305(4) 
would by definition exclude all personality and character 
disorders from the definition of mental illness. The State 
concedes that a proper reading of the statute would be that 
personality, character disorder, and abnormalities are all 
excluded by definition when they are manifested only by repeated 
criminal conduct. Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 4th Ed. 
1987, S 47.33, Referential and Qualifying Words; Salt Lake City 
v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 740-41 (Utah 1977). The latter 
interpretation would be consistent with the testimony of the 
experts in this case who agreed that personality disorders can 
constitute mental illness (R. 89 at 31, 84-86, 102, 131-33). 
Moreover, the Model Penal Code from which S 76-2-305(4) was 
adopted does not exclude all personality disorders, but only 
those abnormalities displayed by repeated criminal behavior. 
Model Penal Code S 4.01(2) (1985). 
However, assuming arguendo that the trial court did 
misinterpret the subsection, any error is harmless as the court 
did find defendant mentally ill for sentencing purposes (R. 72, 
Findings, 1111 2 & 4). Further, the trial court did not totally 
disregard the evidence that defendant "has several personality 
disorders and tends to abuse alcohol and drugs." (R. 74, 
Findings, 11 3). The problem is not so much with the language as 
with the quality of the proof. For even if the trial court had 
considered all personality disorders as potentially constituting 
mental illness, defendant failed to establish by "clear and 
convincing evidence" that those disorders were not merely 
disorders manifested by repeated criminal conduct. State v. 
DePlonty, 749 P.2d 621, 627; Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5(4). 
Even Dr. Golding, who of the five expert witnesses was 
the only expert to state a clear preference for placing defendant 
at the state hospital, testified that defendant's personality 
disorders were manifested by continual usage of illegal drugs and 
a "socially isolated kind of life" (R. 89 at 32-33). Dr. Howard 
Ogilvie of the Davis County Medical Center stated that in 1973 he 
evaluated defendant and found him suffering from mixed 
personality disorder with anti-social features (R. 89; Exhibit D-
5 
See also Montana Code Ann. S 46-14-101 (1979): 
As used in this chapter, the term 'mental 
disease or defect' does not include an 
abnormality manifested only be repeated 
criminal conduct. 
The Montana Code was originally adopted from the Model Penal 
Code. State v. Watson, 211 Mont. 401, 686 P.2d 879, 885 (1984). 
1). But, Dr. Ogilvie did not testify as to whether defendant in 
1989 suffered from any personality disorders and whether any 
disorders manifested themselves in ways apart from repeated 
criminal conduct. Three psychiatrists, Doctors Van Austin, 
Robert Howell and Peter Heinbecker, refused to certify that 
defendant suffered from personality disorders within the meaning 
of S 76-2-305(4), that is, personality disorders not manifested 
only by repeated criminal conduct (R. 89 at 84, 102, 128). 
Thus, classifying any of defendant's personality 
disorders as mental illness would not have changed the trial 
court's conclusion that the prison was still the optimal facility 
for defendant. At best, the evidence established that defendant 
could receive treatment at either the hospital or prison (R. 89 
at 80). More accurately, the evidence established, based on 
three of the examinations of defendant, that defendant's mental 
illnesses could not effectively be treated at the hospital (T. 
93, 99-101, 128). 
C. Defendant Failed to Establish by Clear and 
Convincing Evidence that He Posed a Danger to 
Himself or Others in a Correctional Facility. 
Subsection (b) of S 77-35-21.5(4), discussed in Point 
I, is another criterion which a guilty and mentally ill defendant 
must traverse to be sentenced to a facility other than prison. 
As previously contended, subsection (b) is rationally related to 
a legitimate governmental objective, and therefore, should be 
viewed as constitutional. State v. Copeland, 765 P.2d 1267, 
1272. 
Pursuant to the requirements of subsection (b), the 
trial court heard testimony to determine whether defendant would, 
based on his mental illness, be of any immediate physical danger 
to others or himself if placed in a correctional or probational 
setting. Doctors Ogilvie and Golding expressed some concerns of 
prison incarceration based on what they viewed as defendant's 
"dependent personality" (R. 89 at 13-14, 41-42). Conversely, 
Doctors Austin and Heinbecker presented no concerns for 
defendant's safety (R. 89 at 83-84, 128). Based on defendant's 
prior incarcerations, Dr. Howell testified that defendant posed 
no physical danger if incarcerated (R. 89 at 100). Two lay 
witnesses, Corporal Kelly Roberts and Officer Edward Culbert of 
the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, testified that defendant 
was a model inmate during incarceration at the Salt Lake County 
Jail. None of the experts, however, testified that defendant 
posed an immediate physical danger in prison specifically because 
of his mental illness. Rather, they all agreed that without a 
structured environment, defendant would be extremely dangerous 
due to his abuse of drugs and resultant aggressive behavior (R. 
89 at 13, 36, 99-100). 
Despite this, defendant contends that he is in unique 
danger in prison because of his mental illness. In support of 
this claim defendant points to Dr. Judith Shepard's 1973 90-day 
presentence report of defendant while at the state prison. Based 
on this report, Doctors Golding and Ogilvie had concerns for 
defendant being able to cope in prison (R. 89 at 13-14, 41-42). 
However, the trial court specifically found that defendant would 
be able to properly function "based upon the evidence adduced 
with regard to the defendant's prison incarceration in 1981 and 
1982 and the present functioning in the Salt Lake County Jail" 
(R. 73-74, Findings, 11 8). Moreover, the court recommended, at 
the request of defendant's attorneys, that prison officials 
evaluate defendant for placement in a special services dorm and 
away from drugs or alcohol (R. 65; R. 90 at 23-24). 
Subsection (b) only requires the sentencing court to 
consider whether defendant poses "because of his mental illness 
. . . an immediate physical danger to others or self, which may 
include jeopardizing his own or other's safety, health or welfare 
if placed in a correctional or probation setting," Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-35-21.5(4)(b). It does not require the trial court to 
consider whether a guilty and mentally ill defendant may be 
easily led or abused. The notion that a convicted felon can 
escape incarceration merely because of an inability to assert 
himself, could apply to any number of inmates at the prison. The 
statute requires a more specific showing of danger. Public 
policy does not dictate otherwise. 
Moreover, defendant fails to recognize that he was 
convicted of two homicides, and that the sentencing hearing was 
merely to ascertain whether his mental illness—not his inability 
to resist being led—compels that he receive specialized 
treatment. 
Defendant now attempts to use the trial court's accommodation 
of defendant's own request for a special dorm to bootstrap his 
argument that he is in danger at the prison (Br. of App. 18). 
The record clearly indicated why the recommendation was included. 
(See R. 90 at 23-24). 
Based on the evidence, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in finding that defendant could be safely 
incarcerated in a correctional setting (R. 73-74, Findings, 
% 8 ) . 
D. Defendant Failed To Establish By Clear And 
Convicing Evidence That The State Hospital or 
Another Facility Could Provide Him With Appropriate 
Treatment And Custody. 
Subsection (e) of Utah Code Ann. S 77-35-21.5(4) 
requires the sentencing court to consider whether "the Utah State 
Hospital or other suitable facility can provide the defendant 
with treatment, care and custody that is adequate and appropriate 
to the defendant's conditions and needs." Subsection (e) is the 
final criteria that a guilty and mentally ill defendant must 
satisfy to be sentenced to the state hospital, rather than 
prison. 
While a state may not have "deliberate indifference" to 
the serious medical and psychiatric needs of its inmates, Estelle 
v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Constitution "does not 
guarantee to a prisoner the treatment of his choice." Jackson v. 
Fair, 846 F.2d 811, at 817 (1st Cir. 1988). Nor, does a 
conviction of guilty and mentally ill "ipso facto entitle the 
defendant to be committed to the state hospital rather than the 
state prison", State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261, 268 (Utah 1986). 
Here, a majority of the experts testified that 
defendant's only mental illness is mental retardation. While 
they agreed that defendant qualifies as mentally ill under § 76-
2-305(4), they did not believe that defendant is clinically 
mentally ill. Pursuant to their examinations of defendant, they 
concluded that the state hospital could not provide defendant 
with needed treatment and because of his volatility, needed 
custody. 
Even Dr. Goldingf who preferred to see defendant 
treated at the hospital, conceded that defendant could receive 
adequate treatment for all his illnesses at the prison (R. 89 at 
70, 80). He also recognized the need for strict security with 
defendant (R. 89 at 36). 
Defendant errs in concluding that "the basis of the 
trial court's ruling that defendant did not qualify to be 
sentenced to a treatment facility was that the only mental 
illness the trial court thought statutorily relevant—mental 
retardation—is permanent and cannot be cured." (Br. of App. at 
23.) As discussed in Point 11(B), even assuming arguendo, the 
trial court erroneously interpreted § 76-2-305(4) as excluding 
all personality disorders, the court cured any error by finding 
defendant mentally ill, by admitting all relevant testimony 
concerning whether defendant also suffered from personality 
disorders not manifested by repeated criminality, and by 
admitting evidence to ascertain whether those disorders were 
treatable at the hospital. 
Having failed to convince the trial court by clear and 
convincing evidence that his personality disorders fit within the 
statutory definition and that those disorders required 
specialized treatment, defendant should now be foreclosed from 
employing a harmless error as a springboard for overturning the 
trial court's factual findings. 
In addition to the fact that the hospital could not 
cure defendant's retardation, there was evidence that defendant 
posed a high security risk. As this Court noted in State v. 
Copeland, 765 P.2d 1266, 1271 (Utah 1988): 
If neither the hospital nor any other 
facility can provide 'treatment, care and 
custody that are appropriate to the 
defendant's conditions and needs,' placement 
in such a facility may not be justified 
because of the additional security burdens it 
would impose. A defendant whose mental 
condition is virtually and conclusively 
untreatable would not necessarily be 
appropriately housed in a treatment facility. 
After extensive research in the area of mental retardation and 
criminality, two thoughtful authors similarly concluded that: 
Standard services for the mainstream retarded 
population are not appropriate or sufficient 
for the mentally retarded offender . . . . 
State institutions are not appropriate 
placements, as these offenders are more 
streetwise and sophisticated, have fewer 
physical handicaps, may tend to exploit 
others and are oppositional to routine 
. . . . Staff are trained to deal with 
passive, multi-handicapped clients, not with 
aggressive, streetwise offenders. 
Sandra Garcia and Holly Steele, Mentally Retarded Offenders in 
the Criminal Justice and Mental Retardation Systems in Florida: 
Philosphical, Placement, and Treatment Issues, 41 Ark. L. Rev. 
809, 846 (1988). ' 
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Defendant asserts that at least one of the experts considered 
placement of defendant at the American Fork Training School as 
proper (Br. of App. at 3). Such is not the case (R. 89 at 103). 
Additionally, no evidence was presented in the lower court as to 
the requirements or conditions of acceptance at the state 
training school for convicted defendants; nor, was there any 
evidence as to treatment or security provided. Interestingly, 
the 1989 amendments to S 77-35-21.5 delete any reference to 
"other suitable facility" and specifically limit placement of 
guilty and mentally ill defendants to the prison, state hospital 
or probation. 
Considering the objective of S 77-35-21.5 is to balance 
defendant's treatment needs against society's interest in 
protecting its citizens from dangerous individuals, ample 
evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that defendant 
should be sentenced to prison. The evidence clearly established 
that the Utah State Hospital could not provide him with needed 
treatment, and defendant posed a security risk if sentenced to 
that institution. Taken as a whole, the evidence supports the 
trial court's conclusion that the prison could best treat, care, 
and provide custody for defendant. 
Defendant cites Matter of Giles, 657 P.2d 285 (Utah 
1982), and Colyar v. Third Judicial District Court, 469 F.Supp. 
424 (D. Utah 1979), for the proposition that a mentally ill 
defendant is entitled to be sentenced to the state hospital, even 
if no known treatment is available for defendant's illness. 
Neither case is dispositive of the issues in defendant's case. 
Both involved involuntary commitment proceedings where the issue 
was under what circumstances could an individual be civilly 
committed for custodial care alone. Neither addressed the 
balancing needs of treatment and security related to guilty and 
mentally ill defendants. As recognized by this Court, entirely 
different functions are served by civil and criminal commitments. 
In a criminal sentencing proceeding, there is no issue of 
necessary confinement, only appropriate placement. As such: 
hospitalization is desirable from the 
convicted individual's perspective, whereas 
in involuntary civil commitment cases, the 
individual's preferred choice is non 
hospitalization. 
State v, Copeland, 765 P.2d at 1271. 
In light of the legislative objective behind $ 77-35-
21.5 and because of the lower court's factual findings that 
defendant was not entitled to specialized treatment and 
placement, this Court should affixrm the trial court's judgment 
that defendant be sentenced to the Utah State Prison. 
CONCLUSION 
Subsection (b) of S 77-35-21.5(4) is part of a fair 
procedural rule for determining the appropriate placement for a 
guilty and mentally ill defendant and rationally effectuates a 
legitimate governmental objective. As such, this Court should 
hold as constitutionally valid the application of § 77-35-
21.5(4)(b) to mentally ill defendants. 
In applying the proper standard of review, ample 
evidence supports the trial court's findings that the prison, in 
contrast to other facilities, was the optimal custodial and 
treatment facility for defendant who was convicted of multiple 
homicides. This Court should, therefore, affirm defendant's 
convictions and sentences. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
FINDING OF FACTS AND 
Plaintiff, ) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
V • J 
Case No. Cft 88-528 -
RUSSELL MINER ANDERSON, ) 
Hon. Leonard H. Russon 
Defendant. ) 
The defendant, Russell M. Anderson, represented by James 
Valdez and James Bradshaw, having plead guilty and mentally ill to 
two counts of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second Degree, both 
first degree felonies, and the Court having appointed alienists 
and having received their reports, and the Court having heard 
testimony from five (5) mental health professionals and two (2) 
jailers on June 14, 1988, and the Court having considered several 
offered exhibits and relevant portions of a presentence report 
prepared by Adult Probation and Parole makes the following 
findings: 
1. Section 77-35-21.5(4), Utah Code Annotated mandates 
hospitalization for a person pleading guilty and Dentally ill if 
the defendant establishes by clear and convincing evidence that 
all five sub-parts of Section 77-25-21.5(4) exist. 
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2. With regard to subsection (a) of Section 
77-35-21.5(4), the Court finds that the defendant is mildly to 
moderately mentally retarded. Further, that mental retardation is 
a mental defect as defined in Section 76-2-305(4) and that 
therefore the defendant has a statutory mental illness. 
3. The Court finds that the defendant has several 
personality disorders and tends to abuse drugs and alcohol, 
conditions which do not constitute mental illness as defined by 
Section 76-2-305(4). 
4. The Court further finds that the defendant has no 
mental illness as defined in 76-2-305(4) other than the mental 
retardation described in paragraph 2 above. 
5. With regard to subsection (b) of Section 
77-35-21.5(4) the Court finds that, because of his mental illness, 
the defendant would not pose an immediate physical danger to 
himself or others were he placed into a correctional setting where 
he would not have access to drugs or alcohol. Further, the Court 
finds that the defendant will be able to function at the Utah 
State Prison based upon the evidence adduced with regard to the 
defendant's prison incarceration in 1981 and 1982 and the present 
functioning of the defendant in the Salt Lake County Jail. 
6. With regard to subsection (c) of Section 
77-35-21.5(4) the Court finds that the defendant can make rational 
decisions regarding the acceptance of mental treatment by weighing 
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the possible costs and benefits of treatment, even though the 
defendant is mildly to moderately retarded and has a mental age of 
10. The defendant should not be confused with a 10 year old child 
in terms of sophistication, knowledge or innocence, but instead 
has the same ability to learn and perceive as a normal 10 year old 
and could follow the direction of a treating psychiatrist without 
having a complete understanding of the technical jargon and 
methodologies used by that psychiatrist. 
7. With regard to subsection (d) of Section 
77-35-21.5(4) the Court finds that the Utah State Prison provides 
an appropriate treatment alternative to a court order of 
hospitalization for this defendant. That based upon the testimony 
of the psychiatrists who work both at the Utah State Prison and 
the Utah State Hospital. Further, that the Utah State Prison has 
some programs suited to those of the defendant's needs that can be 
addressed by treatment therapies. 
8. With regard to subsection (e) of Section 
77-35-21.5(4) the Court finds that the Utah State Hospital is not 
a suitable facility for providing the defendant with the 
treatment, care and custody that is adequate and appropriate to 
the defendant's conditions and needs, because no therapies are 
available to treat the defendant's problem of retardation which is 
permanent. Further, that the Utah State Hospital cannot provide 
the secure custody necessary for the defendant who stands 
•w p/Tj 
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convicted of two homicides in Salt Lake County, is awaiting 
sentencing in Davis County on a subsequent Second Degree Homicide, 
and who tends to abuse drugs and/or alcohol. 
9. In sum, the Court finds the defendant has failed to 
establish by clear and convincing evidence that all five 
requirements of Section 77-35-21.5(4) have been met. Although the 
defendant did establish by clear and convincing evidence that the 
defendant has a mental illness as required by subsection (a) of 
Section 77-35-21.5(4), the defendant not only did not meet the 
burden required to establish requirements (b) through (e), but the 
evidence of those points was contrary to the defendant's 
contention. 
THERFORE, the Court concludes that there is no compulsion 
under Section 77-35-21.5(4) to order hospitalization at the Utah 
State Hospital or other suitable mental health facility in 
sentencing Russell Miner Anderson in this matter. 
DATED this ^3v"day of June, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
NARD H. RUSSON, I JUDGE 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
Finding of Fact and 
Conclusion 
Case No. CR 88-528 
Page five 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, Carol Beatie, hereby certify that I delivered Finding 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law to James Valdez and James Bradshaw, 
Attorneys for the Defendant, Russell Miner Anderson, on the Zj 
day of June, 1988. 
sc/0384d 
